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Abstract 
The relationships between mathematics, mathematics education and issues such as social justice 
and equity have been addressed by the sociopolitical tradition in mathematics education. Others 
have introduced explicit discussion of ethics, advocating for its centrality. However, this is an area 
that is still under developed. There is a need for an ethics of mathematics education that can inform 
moment to moment choices to address a wide range of ethical situations. I argue that mathematics 
educators make ethical choices which are necessarily ambiguous and complex. This is illustrated 
with examples from practice. The concept of ethical dimension is introduced as a heuristic to 
consider the awareness of different forms of relationship and arenas of action. A framework is 
proposed and discussed of four important dimensions: the relationship with others, the societal and 
cultural, the ecological and the relationship with self. Attending to the different ethical dimensions 
supports the development of a plural relational ethics. Navigating ethical complexity requires 
embracing diverse and changing commitments. An ethics that takes account of these different 
dimensions supports an ethical praxis that is based on principles of flexibility and a dialogical 
relationship to the world and practice. 
Keywords 
Mathematics education, Ethical dimension, Metaethics  
Introduction 
Mathematics education involves actions informed by beliefs about what is important or worthwhile; 
thus, mathematics education involves value and values, including in relation to fostering well-being 
or conversely diminishing it. The consideration of value involves variously moral reasoning, ethics 
and attending to justice, care and similar qualities. When I refer, in this paper, to value in 
mathematics education, it is such matters I am concerned with rather than other values such as 
aesthetics and truth, notwithstanding their importance in mathematics or their relationship to ethics. 
There is a need to examine these too in relation to ethics and justice in mathematics education. 
However, my concern here is narrower. 
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How we speak of such matters and the language we choose to use entails commitments to, or the 
prioritising of, particular values and to advocating for particular positions or standpoints in moral 
philosophy. Recent concern with value in mathematics education has often been from a 
sociopolitical perspective and framed through a consideration of equity and social justice. This has 
made important contributions to understanding the effects of mathematics education in society and 
the sociocultural influences on school mathematics. So far, arguably, the sociopolitical current has 
been less successful in providing guidance that can inform decisions about immediate and moment 
to moment actions in mathematics education or in articulating the moral principles that inform 
these sociopolitical standpoints. Further, there are issues in our field that are as yet underexplored, 
foƌ eǆaŵple ŵatheŵatiĐs eduĐatoƌs͛ ƌespoŶse to the eĐologiĐal Đƌisis iŶ ǁhiĐh ŵatheŵatics is 
increasingly implicated in diverse ways. 
This paper complements the arguments made by others that ethics should be attended to in 
ŵatheŵatiĐs eduĐatioŶ ;see Atǁeh, ϮϬϭϯ, ϮϬϭϰ; Atǁeh & BƌadǇ, ϮϬϬϵ; D͛Aŵďƌosio, ϮϬϭϬ; EƌŶest, 
2013; Neyland, 2004; Roth, 2013; Walshaw, 2013). Depending on the philosophical position taken, 
issues of justice and fairness may be seen as part of ethics. Others, for example Levinas discussed 
below, consider that justice is related to but distinct from ethics. From this viewpoint, ethics pertains 
principally to the interaction with those we are in direct relationship with. However, the stance I 
take here is that ethical reasoning does concern our personal choices, but requires considering 
relationships that extend beyond the personal or those we are directly connected to. 
I contribute to ethical discussion in mathematics education in four ways. Firstly, I highlight that 
ethical action is ambiguous and ambivalent, thus supporting an ethical standpoint that affirms the 
importance of ethical judgement that attends primarily to relationship rather than to ethical rules. 
Secondly, I extend the previous discussion of relational ethics in mathematics education (Atweh, 
2013, 2014; Atweh & Brady, 2009; Neyland, 2004; Roth, 2013) to consider the nature of relationality 
and the role of mathematics as a mediator and object of relationship. Thirdly, I propose the concept 
of ethical dimension as a useful lens to support mathematics educators to fluidly navigate the 
complexity of ethical dilemmas we face. I propose and discuss three principal meanings of ethical 
dimension. The first is as a field of relational awareness. We are in myriad simultaneous 
relationships that are of potential ethical significance, for example with people we are in direct 
relationship with and also to social entities and groups with whom relationship is less immediate. 
Ethical dimension as relational awareness refers to which aspects of the relationship are attended to 
and considered. The second meaning is as a sphere of action within those fields and the extent to 
which our actions may affect those we are in relationship with. The third meaning is a dimension of 
ethical thought. This latter meaning points to ethical principles or philosophy to inform our actions. 
The fourth contribution is to consider specifically the four particular ethical dimensions: the 
relationship to others,  the social and cultural, the ecological and the relationship to self. The choice 
to delineate these dimensions is informed by a consideration of the ethical issues mathematics 
educators face and ethical sources that have influenced responses to these. 
In the next section, I further outline my approach to ethics. I then offer two vignettes to ground the 
discussion, drawn from my practice as a mathematics educator. The vignettes exemplify ways that 
mathematics education involves issues of value and value laden choices. The vignettes are intended 
as recognisable and illustrative of ethical ambiguity. They remind us that ethics is complex, simple 
principles will not suffice and this points to the need to consider different ethical dimensions which 
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are then discussed. Later, I use the notion of ethical dimension to revisit the vignettes introduced 
earlier in the paper and conclude by discussing some implications of thinking in terms of ethical 
dimensions. 
Ethical stances 
In taking a stance on ethics, it is not possible here to fully recapitulate long-standing debates in 
ethics and metaethics. Rather, I identify some relevant ethical sources that have the potential to 
support mathematics educators in addressing situations and choices we face. 
Metaethics—the study of ethical systems—recognises different ways of distinguishing between 
ethical approaches, often identifying a division between utilitarian (outcome based) and 
deontological (principle based) ethics (Atweh, 2014). However, the primary distinction I consider 
here is one between universalist moral discourse and ethics based on a situated and sensitive 
exercise of practical reason rooted in the ethical understanding of a community (Benhabib, 1992). 
An example of the former can be found in Habermasian discourse ethics or Rawlsian theories of 
distributive justice. Habermas considers agreements that rational agents in a discourse community 
might make based on their common interests (Habermas, 1990). 
An alternative is an ethics based on the exercise of judgement. The notion of praxis, discussed by 
Aristotle, continues to be invoked and developed in relation to issues of value in education (Kemmis 
& Smith, 2008). Aristotelian praxis is centred on individual action but when this is extended to 
collective action it  can become social praxis (Kemmis, 2010). Such a notion gives the possibility of 
eŶgageŵeŶt iŶ pƌaǆis that alloǁs ͞huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe [to ďe] eǆpƌessed thƌough intentional, reflexive, 
meaningful activity situated within dynamic historical and cultural contexts that shape and set limits 
oŶ that aĐtiǀitǇ͟ ;Glass, ϮϬϬϭ, p.ϭϲͿ. WithiŶ those ethiĐal staŶĐes that eŵphasise situatioŶ aŶd 
judgement, a further important distinction is the extent to which ethical judgement should be 
focused on future outcomes or on the immediate situation. In critical pedagogy often the emphasis 
is on the pedagogy as an instrument for achieving liberation or justice (Strhan, 2012), an alternative 
is to consider the judgement and choice in relation to existing situation and relationships rather than 
measured against a desired endpoint. 
The ethical stance I take draws on relational postmodern ethics. Bauman (1993) contends that 
humans are morally ambivalent and actions are not essentially good or bad. Ethical phenomena and 
situations are non-rational, they are not regular and predictable and morality is not universalizable. 
A similar argument is made by Foucault against the moral standpoint advocated by Habermas 
(Brown & McNamara, 2011). This entails rejecting utilitarian and rule-based ethics. Actors are not 
free floating (Bauman, 1993) persons existing outside of social situations, as supposed by 
Habermasian ethics, but exist in concrete situations (Bakhtin, 1993). Because the ethical self is an 
embodied historical entity, a unitary ethics of mathematics education that fits all situations and 
circumstances is not possible. Bauman (1993) argues that this need not lead to moral relativism, if 
this is understood as a comparison between different ethical codes that are culturally applicable. 
However, others writing from a postmodern perspective are more comfortable with embracing a 
qualified relativism (Shildrick, 1997). An alternative, and the position I take here, is to respect an 
ethical pluralism (Anton, 2001) that is entailed not so much by different cultural norms or contexts 
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as by the uniqueness of the ethical actor in each concrete situation (Anton, 2001; Bakhtin, 1993), an 
actor that is social and culturally embedded. 
BauŵaŶ͛s ethiĐal appƌoaĐh dƌaǁs oŶ LeǀiŶas ;ϭϵϴϮ, ϭϵϵϴͿ, ǁhiĐh iŶ tuƌŶ iŶfoƌŵs ŵǇ disĐussioŶ of 
the dimension of relationship to the others below. The overarching metaethical position I take is 
that different ethical approaches are more or less appropriate when considering different ethical 
dimensions and situations. However, I believe that it is possible to extend the principle of alterity 
proposed by Levinas. Developing this argument fully is outside the scope of this paper but rests upon 
an expansion of our understanding of what constitutes the ethical other. Levinas contends that 
ethical responsibility arises from our face to face encounters. This restricts ethical relationships to 
humans. Davy (2007) challenges the importaŶĐe of the ŶotioŶ of ͞faĐe͟ aŶd aƌgues foƌ aŶ eǆteŶsioŶ 
of Levinian ethics to animals and the natural world more generally. Standish (2008) goes further and 
suggests that the other in Levinas can be extended to objects of the study. This opens the possibility 
that our relationship to mathematics too may be marked by responsibility in an ethical sense. 
For Levinas (1998), a concern with justice arises out of being in proximal relationships with multiple 
otheƌs ǁho deŵaŶd ͞ justiĐe, justifiĐatioŶ aŶd ultiŵately weighing up, calculating, judging how I take 
up the ƌespoŶsiďilities I haǀe foƌ all the otheƌs͟ ;“tƌhaŶ, ϮϬϭϮ, p. ϭϰϵͿ. AŶ alteƌŶatiǀe ĐoŶĐept of 
ƌelatioŶalitǇ is fouŶd iŶ BakhtiŶ͛s stƌess oŶ the aĐt of speakiŶg aŶd aŶsǁeƌiŶg aŶd so oŶ dialogue aŶd 
the voice (Erdinast-VulĐaŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. Theƌe aƌe ŵaŶǇ paƌallels ďetǁeeŶ LeǀiŶas aŶd BakhtiŶ͛s ethiĐal 
philosophy (see Erdinast-VulĐaŶ, ϮϬϬϴ; ‘oth, ϮϬϭϯͿ. CeŶtƌal to BakhtiŶ͛s ǀieǁ of laŶguage is that 
͞eaĐh ǁoƌd tastes of the ĐoŶteǆt aŶd ĐoŶteǆts iŶ ǁhiĐh it has lived its socially charged life; all words 
aŶd foƌŵs aƌe populated ďǇ iŶteŶtioŶs͟ ;BakhtiŶ, ϭϵϴϭ, p. ϮϵϯͿ. UŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ethiĐal eŶĐouŶteƌ 
as dialogical entails that our relationship and so ethical responsibility is marked by responsibility for 
a historically situated other. 
The enmeshment of value in mathematics education 
In this section, I offer two vignettes to inform later reflection on issues of value in mathematics 
education. In the subsequent section, I argue that they imply ethical choices. The first of these 
vignettes addresses curriculum issues—of what we should teach in mathematics. It is drawn from 
my practice as a mathematics educator when working in a university teaching undergraduate 
mathematics. 
A group of second year undergraduates, studying to be high school mathematics 
teachers, are in a teaching session of their undergraduate degree – Mathematics with 
Education and Qualified Teacher Status. The session focuses on exploring different 
activities that might be used in the classroom. The content of the activities includes knots, 
commercial logic puzzles, geometric visualisations as well as more usual classroom 
activities. The students engage in the activities before discussing the mathematics 
involved and reflecting on whether or not they would use these in a school classroom and, 
if so, with whom. 
One of the activities models intensive farming of chickens. It models of the conditions 
that battery farmed chickens live in (Shan & Bailey, 1991, p. 208–209). Most students 
argue that the activity is not suitable to use with children as it is too political. Other more 
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oǀeƌtlǇ ͚politiĐal͛ aĐtiǀities, foƌ eǆaŵple oŶ ŵigƌatioŶ floǁs oƌ that addƌess issues of 
multiculturalism, are less resisted, though some also argue that these too are political 
aŶd ŵatheŵatiĐs should ďe ͚Ŷeutƌal͛. 
This vignette raises an issue that is extensively discussed in sociopolitical literature that the 
curriculum content in mathematics is not neutral or value free. Some of the activities appear to be 
͞politiĐal͟ aŶd otheƌs not. If political or socially relevant mathematical contexts are excluded from 
the classroom, then this too is a political choice and has implications for social justice. Further, the 
choice in immediate and specific situations as to what curriculum content to include, or not to 
include, is an ethical choice not only for considerations of social justice but also because of how 
content may alienate or include learners. 
The second vignette raises the question of pedagogy—of how we should teach mathematics. I have 
used the scenario as the basis for a discussion by beginning mathematics teachers to prompt 
reflection on different needs in the classroom (Boylan, 2009). 
A group of 11–12 years olds from the same UK mathematics class have been asked about 
their views of teacher questioning. 
Nikita͛s faŵilǇ aƌƌiǀed ƌeĐeŶtlǇ fƌoŵ aŶ EasteƌŶ EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ. “he ǁaŶts ƋuestioŶiŶg 
episodes to be completed quickly so she can begin individual work. She says that the 
teacher should pick people rather than people putting hands up. 
Susan, from a white British background, wants to avoid answering publicly and would 
prefer if answers were written down individually. A second preference is for forms of 
unison response. 
Lee, from Afro-Caribbean heritage, would like to be part of a ͚teaŵ͛. 
John, a white British student, has two conflicting views. Firstly, he wants people to be 
ĐhoseŶ ͚faiƌlǇ͛ iŶ ƌotatioŶ aŶd to aŶsǁeƌ ǁithout puttiŶg haŶds up ďut he also ǁaŶts 
opportunities for discussion. 
Jenny, from an Afro-Caribbean background, wants short closed questions to which there 
is a straightforward right or wrong answer. Forms of response are not a particular 
concern for her. 
Seera, a British Asian student, does not want to speak publicly and would prefer no 
verbal questioning. If questions are asked she would prefer to discuss first before 
answering. 
The pedagogical choices of the teacher will impact on who participates (or does not participate), 
how they participate and how that participation is experienced, including emotionally. Given the 
different orientations towards teacher questioning of what is only a sub-set of the class, it is 
apparent that there is not a single unambiguously suitable pedagogy for the class. Further, from a 
sociocultural perspective, the forms of participation in turn construct what mathematics is for the 




The vignettes remind us that the actions teachers take (or choices not to act) may support the 
flourishing and well-being of learners and others or impact negatively on them. Thus, mathematics 
education involves issues of ethical concern. The vignettes entail ethical choices that are ambiguous; 
they cannot be resolved through applying a principle or a set of rules. They involve choices with 
contradictory consequences; actions may have both desirable and undesirable outcomes. Thus, they 
aƌe ŵoƌallǇ aŵďiguous aŶd aŵďiǀaleŶt: ͞ǀiƌtuallǇ eǀeƌǇ ŵoƌal iŵpulse, if aĐted upoŶ iŶ full, leads to 
iŵŵoƌal ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϭϵϵϯ, p. ϭϭͿ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, ƋualifiĐations in mathematics affect 
leaƌŶeƌs͛ life ĐhaŶĐes. MatheŵatiĐs ƋualifiĐatioŶs aĐt as a gateǁaǇ to futuƌe studǇ aŶd ďetteƌ paid 
employment. Supporting those who are currently disadvantaged to pass this gateway may support 
changes to patterns of socioeconomic and cultural disadvantage, because differences in 
mathematical attainment reflect and reinforce these. Therefore, a desire to promote equity 
supports actions to maximise student attainment outcomes. However, doing this may inculcate in 
students a focus on learning for results, entailing alienation, self-abnegation, distress and restrictions 
on identities (Reay & Williams, 1999). 
Learning for attainment and learning in ways that promote more creative and agentic identities need 
not be in opposition. However, attainment outcomes are currently the key measure of socially 
legitimated educational worth and are constructed in relation to a wider performativity culture. 
Promoting equity by focusing on student attainment may serve to support and preserve this. There 
are alternatives that appear ethically preferable, for example, a pedagogy that involves a slower 
relationship to learning mathematics which emphasises what Jardine (2012) describes, using a play 
oŶ ǁoƌds, as the ͞ǁhileŶess͟ that ŵakes soŵethiŶg ǁoƌthǁhile. However, these may, in turn, entail 
negative ethical implications given the currency of mathematics qualifications that are rewarded, in 
part, for speed and curriculum coverage. 
Theƌe is Ŷot a ͞ƌight͟ oƌ uŶiǀeƌsal aŶsǁeƌ to these ĐoŶfliĐtiŶg ethiĐal ĐoŶsiderations. Further, this 
ambiguity deepens given the unpredictability of the consequences of our actions (Bauman, 1993). In 
mathematics education research, accounts of adults reflecting on their experience of learning 
mathematics indicate how mathematical experiences have long-teƌŵ iŵpaĐt oŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
relationships to themselves (see, for example Boaler, 2005; Boylan & Povey, 2009). 
Ethical dimensions 
Recognising ethics as ambiguous challenges reliance on ethical codes and the belief in principles or 
rules that are universally applicable. The ethical commitments that are relevant to a specific issue 
are situated. One cannot know in advance which principles will be relevant to a particular situation. 
To recognise that mathematics education is ethically ambiguous entails that there is no single 
desirable pedagogy or curriculum. 
This shifts the focus to relationship, practice and action as sites for ethical reflection. As Bakhtin 
(1981) contends the world must be answered. However, it is not enough to look only to practice and 
action and then to find an ethical choice in any given situation. Without a language to frame our 
reflections on ethical practice, we are required to consider each situation afresh and it inhibits 
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dialogue about ethical choices with others. One way to address this ambiguity and to consider 
appropriate action is through the concept of ethical dimension. 
OfteŶ the teƌŵ ͞diŵeŶsioŶ͟ is used iŶ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ǁith ethiĐs to ƌefeƌ to the ethiĐal aspeĐt of aŶ 
issue or field as a whole in contrast to other aspects. Here, I am using the word differently; each 
ethical dimension points to a different field of relationships. Considering the two vignettes above, 
the narratives suggest different ethical arenas that are relevant. The first foregrounds the content of 
activities and their relationship to sociopolitical and ecological issues. The second vignette focuses 
attentioŶ oŶ the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ŵatheŵatiĐs pedagogǇ iŵpaĐt oŶ leaƌŶeƌs͛ 
relationships to themselves and others and the construction of self through mathematical practices. 
Our relationships in all four dimensions are mediated through mathematics and so our relationship 
with mathematics itself is an ethical relationship. 
I intend for the notion of ethical dimension to convey three meanings, each of which can support 
ethical reflection. The first of these is awareness of the ethics of a situation. The concept of a 
diŵeŶsioŶ of aǁaƌeŶess eĐhoes “piŶoza͛s ĐoŶĐept of plaŶes ;“piŶoza, ϮϬϬϬ; Walshaǁ & BƌoǁŶ, 
2012). Existing, as we do, in webs of relationality, it appears impossible to hold in our awareness the 
complexity of all the different patterns of ƌelatioŶship ͞that ĐaŶŶot iŶ pƌiŶĐiple ďe fitted iŶto the 
ďouŶds of a siŶgle ĐoŶsĐiousŶess͟ ;BakhtiŶ, ϭϵϴϰͿ. Yet, these tǇpes of ƌelatioŶships aƌe Ŷot of the 
same sort. Our ethical awareness can shift focus on to different forms of relationships. Awareness 
expands and contracts either involuntarily or through conscious focus. The second meaning is that 
dimensions are arenas for action. Ethical action involves paying attention to the quality of effects of 
actions in each of the dimensions and in the interrelationships between dimensions. Considering the 
different dimensions as spheres of awareness and action encourages an examination of multiple 
sources in the philosophy of ethics and so entails a third aspect of the meaning of dimension. In 
summary, an ethical dimension refers to awareness, action and sources of ethical thought. 
Others, the societal and cultural, the ecological and the self 
The ethical dimensions considered here are relationships with others, the societal and cultural, the 
ecological and the self. These relate to previous discussions by others concerned with value in 
mathematics education, perhaps because they constitute phenomenologically significant forms of 
human relationship. They denote recognisable areas that are implicated in mathematics education 
and in our relationship with mathematics, even if the boundaries between them may be blurred and 
the dimensions are enmeshed in each other and so are not separate. Nevertheless, the 
categorisation acts as a heuristic and a tool for reflection. In this section, I illustrate the ambit of the 
four dimensions, point to relevant ethical philosophy and highlight important issues in mathematics 
education related to them. The aim is to illustrate ways and directions that ethical discussion in 
mathematics education has been or could be developed. 
Being with others 
As stated earlier, the ethical thought of Levinas has been influential in the development of relational 
ethics (Bauman, 1993) and in the call for ethics to be explicitly considered within mathematics 
education (Atweh, 2013; Atweh & Brady, 2009; Ernest, 2013; Neyland, 2004; Roth 2013). Neyland 
(2004) invokes the philosophy of Levinas when reviewing the neo-liberal agenda in mathematics 
education to argue that ethical responsibility should be the starting point for engagement with 
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others. This is a perspective developed by Atweh and Brady (2009), who propose a socially 
͞ƌespoŶse-aďle͟ ;Puka, ϮϬϬϱͿ ŵatheŵatiĐs eduĐatioŶ. This ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ does Ŷot aƌise fƌoŵ 
exchange and is not dependent on reciprocity; it arises as part of subjectivity within encounters that 
aƌe ͞faĐe to faĐe͟. The ƌelatioŶship to otheƌs is, oƌ should ďe, it is aƌgued, the oƌigiŶal ethiĐal foƌŵ 
from which societal and institutional relationships are developed. 
Roth (2013) applies concepts of encounter and dialogue to provide a close reading of a pedagogical 
episode in a mathematics context. He highlights the exposure of both teacher and learner to each 
other and the role of affect—including not only care and positive regard but also frustration and 
exasperation. In addition, he locates the source of ethical responsibility in answerability and the 
dialogical nature of learning relationships. 
Various implications for practice in mathematics education of an ethics that takes relationship with 
the otheƌ as pƌiŵaƌǇ haǀe ďeeŶ pƌoposed. NeǇlaŶd ;ϮϬϬϰͿ pƌoposes a ͞ƌe-eŶĐhaŶtŵeŶt͟ of 
mathematics education, to develop or restore a sense of purpose and spontaneity and encourages 
surprise and joy. Roth (2013) stresses the importance of fostering dialogue and dialogic relationships. 
The societal and cultural dimension 
Over the last 20 years, there has been an increasing discussion of values in mathematics education 
focused on its political dimensions and on issues of social justice. The sociopolitical turn (Gutiérrez, 
2013) has involved a number of currents and traditions within mathematics education, such as the 
critical mathematics education tradition in Europe (see Alrø, Ravn, & Valero, 2010; Skovsmose, 1994), 
the radical mathematics and mathematics for social justice current in the USA (Gutstein, 2006) and 
ethnomathematics, initially developed in the majority world (Gerdes, 1996; Powell & Frankenstein, 
ϭϵϵϳͿ. Less ƌadiĐallǇ, the teƌŵ ͞eƋuitǇ͟ is used as ŵeaŶs to ƌefeƌ to a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ĐlosiŶg peƌĐeived 
achievement gaps in outcomes (Gutiérrez, 2008). 
Those who highlight the sociopolitical often emphasise social justice and democracy as providing an 
imperative for action. However, ethical discourse is found infrequently (Atweh & Brady, 2009). To 
address this, one approach would be to interrogate the sociopolitical current in mathematics 
education with arguments made in general discussions of social justice in education. Such accounts 
may provide useful tools for reflection on critical mathematics education. Particularly, those that 
draw on both distributive and relational theories of social justice and in doing so emphasise the 
importance of recognition and respect for diversity (Fraser, 1997; Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Griffiths, 
2003; North, 2006, 2008) and participative justice (Fraser, 2008). 
Viewing mathematics as a social and cultural practice points to the temporal aspect of the social and 
cultural dimension. Mathematics is a cultural product of our ancestors and positions humans as 
͞paƌtiĐipaŶts iŶ the great, age-old human conversation that sustains and extends our common 
kŶoǁledge aŶd Đultuƌal heƌitage͟; suĐh a ƌeĐogŶitioŶ eŶtails ͞aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg that the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ is 
gƌeateƌ thaŶ Ǉouƌself͟ ;EƌŶest, ϮϬϭϯ, p. ϭϭͿ. This suggests a ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to mathematics itself. 
The ecological dimension 
D͛Aŵďƌosio ;ϮϬϭϬͿ eǆteŶds ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ǁith soĐial aŶd Đultuƌal issues aŶd ƌelatioŶships to ĐoŶsideƌ the 
global situation. He critiques an unreflective, rationalist and technicist mathematics education that 
does not contribute to the most universal problem facing humanity: survival with dignity. One aspect 
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of the ecological dimension is the role mathematics plays in the current environmental crisis and in 
responses to it. 
Richard Barwell (2013) examines the mathematical formatting (Skovsmose, 1994) of climate change, 
noting how the descriptive, predictive and communicative aspects of climate science involve the use 
of ŵatheŵatiĐs aŶd ŵatheŵatiĐal liteƌaĐǇ. The idea of Đliŵate ĐhaŶge is a ͞ƌealised aďstƌaĐtioŶ͟ 
(Barwell, 2013, p. 10) that, through mathematics, formats the world, but excludes the human 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀes of ĐhaŶgiŶg ǁeatheƌ oƌ the aŶguish of the disƌuptioŶ of people͛s liǀes. 
A significant capitalist response to the environmental crisis has been to enlist mathematics in the 
search for market solutions. Under the banner of green capitalism, mathematics is being used as a 
means to extend the commodification of natural resources in new ways (Sullivan, 2009, 2010). The 
value and worth of the natural world and our relationship to it are transmuted into valorisation; 
everything—water, trees, clean air, biodiversity and ecosystems—can be given a price (Sullivan, 
2010, p. 117). 
Rolston (2007) suggests that we are at a turning point where the technosphere, previously 
constructed within the biosphere, could become the realm in which natural history is located. In 
which case, in the terms Skovsmose (1994) uses, the mathematical and technologically formatted 
seĐoŶd Ŷatuƌe ǁould ďe Ŷot a ͞seĐoŶd Ŷatuƌe͟ ďut ǁould Đoŵe to ďe ǁhat ͞Ŷatuƌe͟ is, ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg 
the final triumph of a disembodied rationality in which mathematics and mathematical processes 
take primacy over and interrupt visceral relationships with the world. 
A more ecologically rooted mathematics education offers the possibility of disrupting the role of 
mathematics in this process of abstraction, commodification and formatting. Jardine (1994) calls for 
a mathematics that does not take human existence and mathematics as prior to encounter with the 
world, but as embedded in it and an aid to appreciation of being: 
Mathematics is not something we have to look up to. It is right in front of us, at our fingertips, 
caught in the whorl patterns of the skin, in the symmetries of the hands, and in the rhythms of blood 
and breath (p. 112). 
Understanding mathematics as part of the fabric of the natural world, the mathematics of kinship 
(Jardine, 1994) can enhance our relationship with the natural world and imbue this relationship with 
generativity and life. This contrasts with the algorithms that, through a process of valorisation, suck 
value from the world leaving empty cyphers standing for complex webs of relationship (Sullivan, 
ϮϬϭϬͿ. D͛Aŵďƌosio pƌoposes a pƌiŵoƌdial ethiĐs that ͞ƌeĐogŶizes the fuŶdaŵeŶtal ŶeĐessitǇ of the 
mutual relatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the iŶdiǀidual, the otheƌ aŶd Ŷatuƌe͟ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p. ϱϵͿ ŵaƌked ďǇ a ƋualitǇ of 
reciprocity which is necessary for both individual and species survival. An ecological ethics implies 
the need for an environmentally informed critical mathematics education but also for a critique of 
the social construction of mathematics itself as separate and disconnected from nature. 
The self 
Subjectivity in mathematics education has been the focus of much analysis, particularly from a 
poststructuralist perspective (see, for example Brown & McNamara, 2011; Walshaw, 2004). These 
analyses provide accounts of the regulated and restricted subjects often produced through the 
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practices of mathematics education. Implicit in such accounts is an ethical critique of the 
consequence of such practices. 
Each ethical actor is unique and so cannot be replaced by another human. The assertion that 
humans are not identical entails that each has a non-transferable responsibility (Levinas, 1982; 
Erdinast-Vulcan, 2008). At the same time, eaĐh is ͞a oŶĐe-oĐĐuƌƌeŶt paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ ďeiŶg͟ ;BakhtiŶ, 
1993, p. 58) which is an expression of the totality of relationships in the universe. The construction 
of the subject that prevails in mathematics education, of the sort of selves that are possible or 
permitted, is disconnected from such an expanded notion of the self. 
Here, I point to two possible ethically preferable alternatives: passion and pleasure and ethical self-
care. In relation to both these areas, the work of Foucault is significant. FouĐault͛s appƌoaĐh is, 
arguably, a postmodern reworking of Aristotelian ethics and so focused on an instrumentalist end 
point of self-mastery and as much freedom from oppression as possible in the context of discursive 
regimes. Such a possibility has been critiqued from a Lacanian perspective as an impossible goal 
given that the attempt to understand oneself in relation to the world is unending (Brown & England, 
2004; Brown & McNamara, 2011). 
However, an alternative relational re-iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of FouĐault͛s ethics of the self is possible, 
understood as the work of the self as an unfolding participation in being aware of itself (Bakhtin, 
1993). Mathematics and mathematical experience is one mediator of the relationship to self. For 
many, this experience currently is one that is implicated in alienation (Boylan & Povey, 2009). 
Alternatively, Foucault offers an ethics based on passion and pleasure. He seeks to reclaim passion 
fƌoŵ its ƌejeĐtioŶ, iŶ ͞Điǀilized͟ disĐouƌses, iŶ paƌt ďeĐause of its assoĐiatioŶ ǁith the body (Foucault, 
1988; Zembylas, 2007). Foucault sees in passion and affective intensity the possibility of the 
disruption of the regulated and normalised self (Zembylas, 2007). 
EŵďƌaĐiŶg FouĐault͛s staŶdpoiŶt suggests ŵakiŶg spaĐe foƌ passioŶ aŶd pleasure in mathematics 
education. This moves beyond the desire to counter or avoid negative affect. An example aligned 
ǁith this seŶtiŵeŶt is Heatheƌ MeŶdiĐk͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of the geŶdeƌed eǆpeƌieŶĐe of 
mathematics which draws on queer theory to propose the queering of mathematics with the aim of 
disturbing and provoking pleasure. Pleasure here includes the enjoyment of challenge and 
intellectual effort. The practices of mathematics education that produce regulated and restricted 
forms of subjectivity are instances of, and embedded in, prevailing practice regimes. Part of 
FouĐault͛s ƌespoŶse to this ĐoŶditioŶ is to pƌoŵote the pƌaĐtiĐe of fƌeedoŵ thƌough ethiĐal self-care 
(Foucault, 1994a) that resists social forces that otherwise would define subjectivity. 
One important aspect of such action is to pay attention to how to create, instigate or foster spaces in 
which learners of mathematics can also develop as ethical actors in relation to each ethical 
dimension. Two aspects of this are important. The first is the development of critical faculties 
(Infinito, 2003). The starting point for critique is to recognise the limits of our situation. Once we 
haǀe a seŶse of ǁho ǁe aƌe aŶd ǁhat is, as it ǁeƌe, ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg us, theƌe Đƌeates the ͞possiďilitǇ of 
no longer ďeiŶg doiŶg, oƌ thiŶkiŶg ǁhat ǁe aƌe, do oƌ thiŶk͟ ;FouĐault ϭϵϵϰď, p. ϯϭϭͿ. WithiŶ 
mathematics education, the critical mathematics and ethnomathematics traditions, discussed earlier, 
identify practices that support the development of critical faculties and examine mathematics as the 
product and producer of social constructions. This creates the possibility of understanding ways in 
which subjectivity is fashioned, in part, by and through mathematical practices. 
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The second aspect of resistance is engaging in the practice of self-construction. The concept of self 
that Foucault employs is at variance with that proposed by Levinas or Bakhtin who, whilst 
recognising the importance of the uniqueness of the individual subjectivity, ground their 
epistemology and ethics in relationship to others. Foucault emphasises care of the self over the care 
of others. However, in the practices of self-Đaƌe, the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of the ƌole eaĐh has iŶ otheƌs͛ self-
construction is recognised. Infinito (2003) proposes that in education this necessitates the need for 
appropriate spaces: 
where individuals can participate in the on-going production of themselves with and in front 
of others where they can be both witness to and resources for the experiments of other 
selves (p. 168). 
This ƌeadiŶg of FouĐault aƌguaďlǇ aǀoids the poteŶtial Đhaƌge that FouĐault͛s ĐoŶĐept of self-care is 
less ethical and more self-centred. Further, such spaces support the development of the self as 
equipped to fulfil ethical responsibility for others. This moves the ethiĐal eŶƋuiƌǇ fƌoŵ ͞hoǁ should I 
liǀe?͟ to ͞hoǁ should ǁe liǀe?͟ 
HaŶd ;ϮϬϭϮͿ, iŶ a studǇ of the pƌaĐtiĐes of teaĐheƌs, eŶgaged iŶ ͞eƋuitaďle ŵatheŵatiĐs iŶstƌuĐtioŶ͟ 
dƌeǁ oŶ teaĐheƌs͛ desĐƌiptioŶs of theiƌ pƌaĐtiĐes to ideŶtifǇ the ĐoŶĐept of ͞takiŶg up spaĐe͟. TakiŶg 
up space refers both to space in the classroom through participation, but also to taking up space 
beyond the classroom. She quotes one teacher talking about the connection between space in the 
classroom and their aspirations for their students to take up space that is closed off due to socio-
economic and cultural factors. Here, we hear echoes of Foucault: 
It͛s like, ďeiŶg aďle to haǀe the tools to saǇ, ͚If I Đould do this, I ǁill ďeĐoŵe aŶǇthiŶg, I ǁill 
get out there and take up my space͛ p. Ϯϯϴ 
Here, also, I contend, we see how the different dimensions of mathematics are enmeshed. 
Supporting the development of autonomous actors in the mathematics is not opposed to addressing 
the sociopolitical and other ethical dimensions but intimately connected to it. 
Mathematics classrooms in which there is only one or a limited number of ways to participate in 
learning mathematics deny the possibility of such spaces. One way of creating alternative 
possibilities is for teachers to allow themselves to ďe seeŶ ďǇ studeŶts as ͞puƌposefullǇ iŶĐoŵplete͟ 
(Infinito, 2003, p.170). In the mathematics classroom, this supports the practice of de-centering 
mathematical authority and for teachers and students to work collaboratively together at times on 
problems which neither students nor the teacher know the answers to. 
Navigating dimensions 
The vignettes presented above point to the existence of different and competing ethical 
commitments. I have proposed the concept of dimension as one way to conceptualise this. There are 
two ways that ethical dimensions are relevant to the navigation of ethical issues: firstly, when 
considering different commitments in relation to a single dimension and, secondly, when 
considering tensions between commitments related to different dimensions. 
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The first vignette focused on choices about the curriculum content on a mathematics teacher 
education degree, and so the content modelled as suitable for the school mathematics classroom. 
Considering the social and cultural dimension, tensions are apparent. Mathematical tools are 
needed for people to engage in understanding the societal choices we make including in relation to 
industrial food production. However, using the material on industrial farming is provocative and may 
alienate students from the main purpose, to develop criticality about the nature of school 
mathematics and so support the long-term project of changing school mathematics practices. The 
idea of using this activity may be far outside their current beliefs of what is appropriate, so they are 
unlikely to use it and this suggests considering alternative content that might still challenge but be 
more readily taken up. 
Similarly, in the second vignette, the democratic classroom is an ideal that supports the project of 
mathematics contributing to the development of engaged citizens. However, this is dependent on 
the extent to which learners want to and can involve themselves in such a setting. The social and 
cultural capital needed to engage with this form of pedagogy is not evenly distributed in terms of 
gender, ethnicity and social class. Thus, promoting what appear to be democratic practices may 
favour those students who are advantaged and so help reproduce inequity. In the second vignette, 
we see also how there is no simple answer to enacting a pedagogy that supports the flourishing of all 
studeŶts iŶ aŶǇ Đlass. IŶdeed, atteŵptiŶg to ŵeet soŵe leaƌŶeƌs͛ eǆpƌessed desiƌes ŵaǇ seƌǀe to 
foster the entrenchment of regulated subjects. 
Examining choices in terms of different dimensions highlights a second form of dilemma—the way in 
which considering one dimension may point in the direction of a particular action but considering 
other dimensions may suggest alternatives. For example, we live in a world in which intensive meat 
production is implicated in climate change. Industrial meat production is also implicated in 
inequitable distribution of food that leads to hunger and malnutrition for many—an example of the 
primacy given to the commodification of the natural world. Given the ecological, social and cultural 
ethical imperatives to address this, arguably, this should be included in the curriculum, not least to 
nourish independent and critical thinking. Yet, individuals in the group are disturbed and 
discomforted by encountering these materials. My ethical responsibility to students implies I should 
be mindful of their well-being and the emotional states I may catalyse. Further, the general intention 
of this module and the underlying ethos of the course were to support a re-enchantment (Neyland, 
2004) with mathematics. Provoking discomfort may be at variance with enacting a pleasurable 
mathematics curriculum. Thus, ethical choice here is ambiguous. 
Moreover, there are instances where the same ethical principles may manifest in different 
dimensions in ways that are in tension. So, in the second vignette, a concern for enabling students to 
influence the pedagogical practices of the classroom is intrinsic to a democratic classroom, as is 
attending to the individual needs of students. A democratic classroom has potential benefits for the 
participants. It can allow for individuals to participate in autonomous ways and to develop their 
mathematical authority. The ethical principle that supports this is a commitment to participative 
justice (Fraser, 2008). Engaging with such principles is one way to address the impossibility of 
ŵeetiŶg the studeŶts͛ ǀaƌied eǆpƌessed desiƌes. Yet, atteŶdiŶg to those fƌeedoŵs ŵaǇ ďe ĐouŶteƌ 
posed to the possibility of reproducing socioeconomic relationships that are inimical to participation. 
A teaĐheƌ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to fƌeedoŵ aŶd autoŶoŵǇ of studeŶts iŶ the heƌe aŶd Ŷoǁ poiŶts iŶ the 
direction of maximising their opportunities to choose what and how they study. A commitment to 
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the future freedom of students may lead to restricting what and how they study, in order to 
maximise their opportunities to gain qualifications that may lead to greater economic freedom. 
Conclusion 
To support the argument that ethics is important in mathematics education, I considered a variety of 
ethical choices that occur in classrooms, using the notion of dimension as means to simplify the 
͞iŶfiŶitelǇ Đoŵpleǆ ĐoŶditioŶ of the ŵoƌal self͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϭϵϵϯ, p.ϭϰͿ. The Ŷeed to ĐoŶsideƌ diffeƌeŶt 
dimensions arises from ethical ambiguity as illustrated by the vignettes which are illustrative of the 
myriad ethical choices mathematics educators make. I have discussed four sources of ambiguity: 
firstly, that the same action may both serve to realise an ethical commitment and to hinder it; 
secondly, the unknowability of the effects of action; thirdly, tensions between different 
commitments; and, fourthly, the situated nature of the relevance of different commitments 
including the relative importance ascribed to different dimensions in particular situations. This 
suggests the need for an ethical sensibility that is fluid and situated, one in which both the 
commitments and the relationship between them is not fixed in advance. 
Informed by the previous discussion and research in mathematics education concerned with value, I 
have introduced the concept of ethical dimension and proposed four dimensions as important—the 
other, the social and cultural, the ecological and the self. Thinking in terms of different ethical 
dimensions suggests a range of sources for mathematics education ethics. Clearly, there are tensions 
between these sources. This in turn is a reflection of the different ontological and epistemological 
qualities of the dimensions. 
The concept of dimension potentially allows different axiological positions in mathematics education 
to be, as it were, brought into conversation with each other. It invites an ethical pluralism that 
eǆteŶds BakhtiŶ͛s polǇphoŶiĐ episteŵologǇ iŶto ethiĐs. This episteŵologǇ pƌoposes that tƌuth aƌises 
momentarily. It cannot be expressed in a single statement from an individual bearer of a singular 
truth, but only through dialogue between position holders, through simultaneous and even 
contradictory statements (Sidorkin, 2002). This potentially allows for a further form of navigation, to 
find a path between an ethical relativism that proposes that choices and stances are inherently 
individual and subjective and an ethical absolutism. 
Mapping ethical dimensions supports an ethical praxis that can help to navigate the type of 
ambiguities discussed earlier by distinguishing different relationships and responsibilities. The 
ambiguity and ambivalence of action and the distance between action and outcomes mean that 
praxis involves continual adjustment and change. Mathematics education that is informed by a 
postmodern ethical sensibility will involve less the implementation of a programme for social justice 
or equity, but more a dance between and with different ethical demands. This approach resonates 
ǁith FouĐault͛s ;ϭϵϵϰaͿ eŵphasis oŶ ethiĐs as practice or those who contend that social justice is not 
a state of affairs to arrive at but rather a verb, an action and a process (Griffiths, 2003; Roth, 2013). 
Ethical action is always provisional. The best we can do is move step by step, and as we do this our 
actions change the world. As action is dialogical, each step taken means that our awareness 
increases of the situation, our role in it and the effects of our actions; responsibility requires 
experimentation and embrace of uncertainty (Derrida, 1992). The concept of ethical dimension is a 
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way of supporting reflection and dialogue about the ethical choices we face. It supports the 
development of a shared language to discuss our ethical choices and a praxis that is based on 
principles of flexibility and a dialogical relationship to the world and practice. This in turn can inform 
a collective enterprise of developing an ethical mathematics education. 
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